Introduction
At its first session (1949) the International Law Commission (ILC) adopted a provisional list of topics which included "State Responsibility". 1 In 1953 the General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution requesting the ILC "to undertake the codification of the principles of international law governing State responsibility." 2 However, it was not until 1955 that the ILC appointed its first Special Rapporteur, F.V. García Amador, to address the subject.
In 1960, the UNGA criticized the ILC Report produced during the ILC's twelfth session, which included a review Special Rapporteur Garcia's fifth Report,. 3 The UNGA then decided that to survey Member States on the entire field of international law to prepare a new list of topics for the codification and progressive development of international law. 4 Having surveyed the state of international law, the UNGA recommended that the ILC continue its work in the field of State responsibility. 5 The ILC decided to create a sub-commission of ten members, under the presidency of Roberto Ago to deal with this topic. This body recommended that the Commission define the general rules of State responsibility and suggested a list of the main points which could serve as a guide to a new rapporteur. 6 In that list appeared the item "State responsibility in respect of acts of private persons. Question of the real origin of international responsibility in such cases." 7 Ago's Report is the real starting point of an evolution aimed at the codification of the international law on State responsibility. The latest Report on the matter is James Crawford's Report of 2001. 8 It is well known that ICJ jurisdiction refers only to States. Article 34.1 of the ICJ Statute says that " [o] nly states may be parties in cases before the Court", and Article 36.1 circumscribes the competence to the "cases which the parties refer to it." According to Article 36.2, the Court's jurisdiction entails "questions of [public] international law and those related to international responsibility and reparations."
The jurisdiction of the UN international ad-hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda is limited to the prosecution of "persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law." 9 Consequently, it is necessary to keep in mind that, when comparing the jurisprudence of the ICJ and of the ICTY, these bodies have a very different competence.
The Nicaragua Case

10
In its Judgment of 27 June 1986 in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 11 ("the Nicaragua case"), the ICJ dealt with the following issue: was the "contra" force a de jure or de facto organ of the United States acting in and against Nicaragua?
In this case the Court said that "[i]n the light of the evidence and material available to it, the Court is not satisfied that all the operations launched by the contra force, at every stage of the conflict, reflected strategy and tactics wholly devised by the United States. However, it is in the Court's view established that the support of the United States authorities for the activities of the contras took various forms over the years, such as logistic support, the supply of information on the location and movements of the Sandinista troops, the use of sophisticated methods of communication, the deployment of field broadcasting networks, radar coverage, etc. The Court finds it clear that a number of military and paramilitary operations by this force were decided and planned, if not actually by United States advisers, then at least in close collaboration with them, and on the basis of the intelligence and logistic support which the United States was able to offer, particularly the supply aircraft provided to the contras by the United States." 12 However, " [t] he Court [took] the view that United States participation, even if preponderant or decisive, in the financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping of the contras, the selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and the planning of the whole of its operation, is still insufficient in itself, on the basis of the evidence in the possession of the Court, for the purpose of attributing to the United States the acts committed by the contras in the course of their military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. All the forms of United States participation mentioned above, and even the general control by the respondent State over a force with a high degree of dependency on it, would not in themselves mean, without further evidence, that the United States directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian law alleged by the applicant State. Such acts could well be committed by members of the contras without the control of the United States. For this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in principle have to be proved that that State had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed." 13 The Court found, however, that certain acts were directly attributable to the United States, such as some attacks on Nicaraguan ports, oil installations and naval bases and the laying of mines in the internal or territorial waters of Nicaragua.
In this case, "after having rejected the argument that the contras were to be equated with organs of the United States because they were 'completely dependent' on it, [the ICJ] added that the responsibility of the Respondent could still arise if it were proved that it had itself 'directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian law alleged by the applicant State'; 14 " this led to the following significant conclusion: "For this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in principle have to be proved that that State had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed."
15
Thus according to the ICJ's reasoning, the "contras" could only be deemed as an organ acting on behalf of the United States Government if the degree of control exercised by the latter was so extreme that the "contras" were totally dependent on the United States.
The Srebenica Case
16
Based on the Krstić and on the Blagojević Trial Chamber Judgments, 17 the ICJ found that Bosnian Serb forces killed over 7,000 Bosnian Muslim men following the takeover of 12 Id. at para. 106. 13 Id. at para. 115. 14 Id. at para. 115. Footnote of the original. "In the text of article 8, the three terms 'instructions', 'direction' and 'control' are disjunctive; it is sufficient to establish any one of them. At the same time it is made clear that the instructions, direction or control must relate to the conduct which is said to have amounted to an internationally wrongful act." 2001 ILC Report, p. 108. 15 The Nicaragua case, para. 399. 16 The ICJ considered then whether the acts committed at Srebrenica in July 1995, involving operations led by members of the VRS in Bosnia-Herzegovina which the ICJ had already found constituted the crime of genocide, were attributable to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), called afterwards Serbia. Three issues were considered for this purpose: whether the acts of genocide could be attributed to Serbia under the rules of customary international law of State responsibility; whether acts of the kind referred to in Article III of the Genocide Convention, other than genocide itself, e.g., complicity in genocide, were committed by persons or organs whose conduct could be attributable to Serbia under the same rules of State responsibility; and whether Serbia complied with its twofold obligation to prevent and punish genocide. committed the massacres did act on the instructions or under the direction or control of Serbia. 23 The ICJ considered, for this purpose, certain ILC Articles on State Responsibility, 24 giving them the character of customary international law and, hence, applicable in the case under consideration. Although reference is made to other articles, the following are the ones quoted by the ICJ:
Article 4
Conduct of organs of a State 1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial unit of the State. 2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the State.
Article 8 Conduct directed or controlled by a State
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of that State in carrying out the conduct.
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Article 14 Extension in time of the breach of an international obligation
[…] 3. The breach of an international obligation requiring a State to prevent a given event occurs when the event occurs and extends over the entire period during which the event continues and remains not in conformity with that obligation.
Article 16
Aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: (a) That State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State. 27 According to these principles, a State is responsible for the illegal acts committed by any of its organs and also for the acts of those groups or persons which are not its organs but on which it exercises such a degree of control that those groups or persons can be considered totally dependent on the State. In cases other than this, the responsibility cannot be attributed to the State.
In Tadić, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that 23 Id., at para. 384. 24 "One should distinguish the situation of individuals acting on behalf of a State without specific instructions, from that of individuals making up an organised and hierarchically structured group, such as a military unit or, in case of war or civil strife, armed bands of irregulars or rebels. Plainly, an organised group differs from an individual in that the former normally has a structure, a chain of command and a set of rules as well as the outward symbols of authority. Normally a member of the group does not act on his own but conforms to the standards prevailing in the group and is subject to the authority of the head of the group. Consequently, for the attribution to a State of acts of these groups it is sufficient to require that the group as a whole be under the overall control of the State." The Tribunal's mandate is directed to issues of individual criminal responsibility, not State responsibility, and the question in that case concerned not responsibility but the applicable rules of international humanitarian law. In any event it is a matter for appreciation in each case whether particular conduct was or was not carried out under the control of a State, to such an extent that the conduct controlled should be attributed to it." 31 In the same vein, the ICJ opined that:
he Court has given careful consideration to the [ICTY] Appeals Chamber's reasoning in support of the foregoing conclusion, but finds itself unable to subscribe to the Chamber's view. First, the Court observes that the ICTY was not called upon in the Tadić case, nor is it in general called upon, to rule on questions of State responsibility, since its jurisdiction is criminal and extends over persons only. Thus, in that Judgment the Tribunal addressed an issue which was not indispensable for the exercise of its jurisdiction. As stated above, the Court attaches the utmost importance to the factual and legal findings made by the ICTY in ruling on the criminal liability of the accused before it and, in the present case, the Court takes fullest account of the ICTY's trial and appellate judgments dealing with the events underlying the dispute. The situation is not the same for positions adopted by the ICTY on issues of general international law which do not lie within the specific purview of its jurisdiction and, moreover, the resolution of which is not always necessary for deciding the criminal cases before it. "This is the case of the doctrine laid down in the Tadić Judgment. Insofar as the 'overall control' test is employed to determine whether or not an armed conflict is international, which was the sole question which the Appeals Chamber was called upon to decide, it may well be that the test is applicable and suitable; the Court does not however think it appropriate to take a position on the point in the present case, as there is no need to resolve it for purposes of the present Judgment. On the other hand, the ICTY presented the 'overall control' test as equally applicable under the law of State responsibility for the purpose of determining --as the Court is required to do in the present case--when a State is responsible for acts committed by paramilitary units, armed forces which are not among its official organs. In this context, the argument in favour of that test is unpersuasive." 32 Hence, the ICJ relied on its "settled jurisprudence [to] determine whether the Respondent ha[d] incurred responsibility under the rule of customary international law set out in Article 8 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility" 33 and not having found any evidence proving that instructions were issued by the FRY to kill the adult male population of the Muslim community in Srebrenica and still less that any such instructions were given with the specific intent (dolus specialis) characterizing the crime of genocide, the ICJ rejected the application to attribute the acts of those who committed genocide at Srebrenica to the FRY. 34 The Perišić Case 35 According to the ICTY Prosecutor's Indictment, the VRS perpetrated war crimes and crimes against humanity in Sarajevo 36 and Srebrenica 37 (Bosnia-Herzegovina), and the Army of Serbian Krajina (SVK) attacked civilians during the shelling of Zagreb (Croatia) between 1993 and 1995. 38 The FRY and the Yugoslav Army (VJ) provided logistical support (which included infantry and artillery ammunition, fuel, spare parts, training and technical assistance) and personnel assistance (a number of VRS and SVK officers were drawn from the ranks of the Yugoslav Army). These officers officially remained members of the VJ even as they were fighting in Bosnia and Croatia under the banners of the VRS and SVK. The Prosecutor considered that under articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the ICTY Statute, Momčilo Perišić, who was the top military officer of the VJ, headquartered in Belgrade (Serbia), a position he held from August 1993 until November 1998 39 was personally responsible as a superior for those crimes, and for having failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators.
The Chamber acquitted the Accused of all charges in the Sarajevo and Srebrenica cases. 40 The argument was that the Trial Chamber could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that Perisić had effective control over perpetrators of the crimes committed in Sarajevo and Srebrenica and that a superior-subordinate relationship existed between them at the time of their commission. However, recalling that a superior is bound to take 'necessary and reasonable measures' to ensure that the perpetrators of the crimes in question are brought to justice but that the evidence did not show any meaningful attempts by Perisić to punish the perpetrators of the crimes committed by the shelling of Zagreb on 2 and 3 May 1995, a majority of the Chamber found that Perisić failed to take the reasonable and necessary steps to punish his subordinates serving in the SVK for the crimes they committed through the shelling of Zagreb on 2 and 3 May 1995 and considered him responsible for failing to punish the perpetrators of crimes committed in Zagreb on 2 and 3 May 1995. 41 In the same vein, the Majority found the Accused guilty as a superior for failing to prevent and/or punish his alleged subordinates 42 and guilty as an aider and abettor 43 in relation to the Zagreb case.
The president of the Chamber, Judge Moloto, dissented from the Majority, providing a detailed analysis of the salient legal issues raised in the Judgement. If we are to accept the Majority's conclusion based solely on the finding of dependence, as it is in casu, without requiring that such assistance be specifically directed to the assistance of crimes, then all military and political leaders, who on the basis of circumstantial evidence are found to provide logistical assistance to a foreign army dependent on such assistance, can meet the objective element of aiding and abetting. I respectfully hold that such an approach is manifestly inconsistent with the law." 50 was obeyed. For effective control to be established, it is not enough that the superior gave orders; the order must be obeyed." 51 "The Prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Momćilo Perišić exercised effective control 52 over the members of the 40th PC who shelled Zagreb on 2 and 3 May 1995. In my view, based on the above analysis of the evidence, the Prosecution failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that Perišić had effective control over members of the 40th PC who perpetrated the crimes charged. Consequently, I respectfully disagree with the Majority's finding that Perišić is individually criminally responsible for th [ose] crimes." 53 Neither the judgement nor the dissenting opinion mention the two decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) related to the issue of control over foreign troops. But the ICTY Majority probably took into account the ICJ Decision on the Bosnia-Herzegovina vs. Serbia case, in which the ICJ said that the responsibility of the FRY in the Srebenica case has not been proven and, consequently, that the genocide could not be attributed to the FRY, to declare that Perisić was not responsible for related acts. However, as there was not a similar decision on the Zagreb bombing, the Majority of the Trial Chamber, conveniently ignoring that the parameters were probably the same, declared Perisić responsible.
It bears to recall that the ICTY was dealing with individual, not State, criminal responsibility. But it is necessary to recall as well that Perisić was the commander in chief of the VIJ, the army of FRY, and not of the VRS and SVK. Although the jurisdiction of the ICTY does not extend to consider if the FRY had any responsibility on these crimes, it is difficult to avoid considering that if Perisić, an officer indubitably under the control of the FRY, is found responsible for crimes committed in another State, some kind of responsibility attaches to the FRY.
Conclusion
The ICTY theory of the "overall control" 54 differs substantially of the one proposed by the ICJ (the "effective control"). The first probably works while it stays within the limits of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, even if it is considered as an international conflict. But it creates a lot of problems when it is extended out of the borders of that limited conflict.
Addendum: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Human rights treaties deserve special consideration because they are lex specialis and consequently the customary law on State Responsibility cannot be fully applicable. The treaties themselves determine how the responsibility is attributable to the State in cases of violations of human rights.
In the American Convention on Human Rights, 55 the States Parties undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized in the Convention and to ensure the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination (Article 1), for all persons subject to their jurisdiction. Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Article 1 is not already ensured by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms (Article 2).
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACourt) have competence with respect to matters relating to the fulfillment of the commitments made by the States Parties to the Convention (Article 23).
The jurisdiction of the IACourt comprises all cases concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Convention that are submitted to it by the States having recognized such jurisdiction (Article 62.3).
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by the Convention, the Court must rule that the injured party be ensured by the responsible State the enjoyment of the violated right or freedom and if appropriate that the consequences be remedied and fair compensation be paid to the injured party (Article 63.1). As previously mentioned, only the States are responsible in these cases. The Convention does not have provisions about third parties' wrongful acts that can trigger State responsibility. Consequently, it is necessary to apply common international law in such instances involving the actions of third parties. These customary rules are applicable in particular when there is an insurrectional movement against a the government that has committed violations of human rights. The "control theory" becomes then fully applicable, be it the more restricted view of the ICJ or the more lenient one of the ICTY.
According to the ILC, no government can be held responsible for the conduct of rebellious groups committed in violation of its authority, where it is itself guilty of no breach of good faith, or of no negligence in suppressing insurrection. This is a "wellestablished principle of international law", supported in arbitral jurisprudence (mixed claims commissions and arbitral bodies) 56 because normally the structures and organization of the movement are and remain independent of those of the State.
Let us suppose that in those cases the applicable theory is the "overall control", i.e., that for the attribution to a State of acts of these groups it is sufficient that the group as a whole be under the overall control of the State. 57 However, the IACourt has developed a new theory according to which, as the State is obliged to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of the rights and freedoms, any violation of human rights is attributable to the State or one of its agents. It is presumed that there is always negligence by the State in suppressing insurrection for attributing responsibility to it. If an agent of the State has the responsibility of protecting the population and fails −for example, the rebellious group attacks the civilian population and the army as an "institutional guarantor" is unable to avoid the human rights violations− b, the State is responsible. 56 ILC Report, p.50. 57 The Tadić Appeals Chamber Decision on Jurisdiction at para. 120. 
